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Models of Capitalism in Europe:  
Towards the Return of the State?* 
Steffen Lehndorff 
 
The present economic crisis has sparked a new debate in a wider political 
and academic public about the role of the state in advanced capitalist so-
cieties. The paper discusses this issue in a comparative perspective: How 
have different models of capitalism in Europe coped with major economic 
and societal challenges before the present crisis? Taking the UK and Swe-
den as flagship examples for contrasting models of capitalism in Europe, 
and Germany as an increasingly controversial case between these poles, 
the paper describes major moves taken in these three countries, from the 
mid-1990s, to tackle the challenges of globalisation and the liberalisation 
of EU labour and product markets, and to respond to societal changes such 
as ageing and the changing gender roles. It concludes with a comparative 
assessment of changes in these three models of capitalism in Europe be-
fore the current economic crisis as a basis for an outlook at the respective 
prospects in the near future, given the legacies of this crisis for public 
budgets and the capacities of the states. 
Key words: varieties of capitalism, co-ordinated and liberal market 
economies, role of the state in contemporary capitalism,  
welfare and gender regimes 
                                           
*  The findings and analysis presented in this article are based on the ‘Dynamics of 
National Employment Models’ (DYNAMO) project, which was funded by the Euro-
pean Commission, and draw in particular on my work with Jill Rubery and Gerhard 
Bosch on editing a book on the changes in employment models in nine European 
countries (Bosch et al. 2009). Unless other sources are expressly indicated, the infor-
mation on and assessments of the EU member states mentioned in the article are based 
on the country analyses published in this book and listed in the bibliography. 
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1. Introduction 
The massive economic and financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 triggered a new 
debate on the future role of the state in capitalist economies. This is hardly 
surprising. The contrast between the billions pumped in by governments in an 
attempt to save their economies and rescue their financial institutions and the 
previously almost undisputed article of faith that the ‘market’ achieves the 
best possible outcome and that the state should keep out of the economy as 
far as possible is indeed dramatic. True, Nicolas Sarkozy might well have 
been accused of exaggeration when he declared that ‘the ideology of the 
dictatorship of the market and the powerlessness of the state died with the 
financial crisis’ (FAZ, 24.10.2008). Nevertheless, the contrast between this 
ideology and the measures governments across the world had to take in order 
to stem the crisis most certainly give us every reason to examine the extent 
and substance of the ‘return of the state’ (e.g. Leibfried 2008, Huffschmid 
2008). 
However, the question – also posed by the authors referred to above – is 
what is meant by ‘return’. Even in the heyday of the market mythology, the 
state was never actually absent. Indeed, the basic conditions for the develop-
ment of the gigantic bubble in the financial markets and for the dominance of 
the financial over the ‘real’ economy were actually created by government 
action, namely the deliberate elimination of the existing regulations and fiscal 
framework within which economic actors used to operate (Krugman 2007). 
At the same time, the neo-liberal state took on new tasks and, particularly in 
the wake of privatisation policy, developed into a ‘market creating state’ 
(Levy 2006). Thus neo-liberalism always required the existence of a state 
capable of acting.  
The most forcible objection to the idea that the state has become less im-
portant in the era of neo-liberalism is surely that raised by the varieties of 
capitalism school (Hall/Soskice 2001). This strand of the institutional tradi-
tion can be reduced in its essence to the idea that market transactions – the 
starting point for all classical and neoclassical analysis in economics – are 
impossible in practice without the existence of social institutions (cf. the 
stimulating retrospective survey by Coates 2005). The most important argu-
ment of this school is that productivity and growth can be promoted not only 
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by arrangements that allow the much vaunted free play of market forces the 
scope it requires to operate but also by those institutional systems that serve 
as barriers to the spontaneous working of market forces. In ‘coordinated 
market economies’, the latter can be as effective in promoting economic 
growth and employment as the former in ‘liberal market economies’, pro-
vided that the institutional system has a sufficiently high level of coherence 
and complementarity to encourage firms to adopt a long-term approach to 
their activities. Thus in the ‘coordinated market economies’, of which Swe-
den and Germany are always named as typical representatives, in contrast to 
the UK, which is regarded as the flagship of the ‘liberal market economy’ in 
Europe, the leading actors’ interest in a regulating state as an important 
anchor of the entire institutional system probably did not weaken even in the 
years of neoliberal dominance (Hall 2007).  
In contrast to this view of things, critical references have been made to the 
risk of functionalism (Crouch/Farrell 2002). In the face of the ‘broad process 
of liberalisation’ (Streeck/Thelen 2005) that has become ever more dominant 
even in Europe since the 1980s, there have, it is true, been various forms of 
institutional change, but in essence they have always involved adjustment to 
this fundamental tendency of contemporary capitalism. If this line of argu-
ment is followed, then the ‘return’ of the state would probably be confined to 
a temporary renaissance of economic stabilisation policy and an attempt to 
use regulation to contain undesirable developments in the financial markets. 
This would be absolutely consistent with the mainstream that can currently be 
observed in the economic policy debate within the EU. 
Our concerns in investigating the change in European employment models 
(see footnote 1 above) were somewhat different from those in the strands of 
the literature referred to above. Firstly, we examined the interaction between 
the institutional architectures of national models of capitalism and the lead-
ing actors in state, economy and society. Fundamental tendencies in contem-
porary capitalism, such as the ‘broad process of liberalisation’, come up 
against particular political power relations in different countries and, depend-
ing on the precise power relations in question, the leading actors position 
themselves relative to the existing institutional system. They may develop 
and pursue strategies aimed at adjustment or even revitalisation, they may, 
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through inactivity or political failure, encourage the erosion or undermining 
of the institutional arrangements or they may actively pursue the dismantling 
of existing institutions. Secondly, we started from the assumption that the 
neo-liberal mainstream is not the only source of pressure to adjust impacting 
on existing models of capitalism. Pressure for change is also generated by 
major social changes, such as the shift in gender roles, increasing ethnic 
diversity and the ageing of European societies, all of which are processes that 
can be included under the heading of ‘demographic change’. The leading 
actors’ reactions to these processes, which to date have been examined 
primarily in the debate on the change in welfare states (Esping-Andersen 
1999) but have been largely ignored in the varieties of capitalism literature, 
are not of course uninfluenced by the dominant neo-liberal philosophy. At the 
same time – and this applies particularly to the change in gender roles – they 
constitute changes in social behaviour and thus have an effect on political 
power relations. 
Adopting such a perspective results in a distinctive approach to the ques-
tion of the ‘return of the state’. Firstly, attention is drawn to the differing 
strategies adopted by leading actors in different countries in their efforts to 
meet the fundamental challenges to national models of capitalism arising out 
of processes such as globalisation or demographic change. Secondly, the 
interplay of these very different challenges creates space to consider the 
potential for future developments (and the political mobilisation of that 
potential), the direction of which does not in any way have to be predeter-
mined by the currently dominant trends, however powerful they may be.1 
This is the approach used in the present article to outline the different paths 
that, despite many similarities, the implementation and assimilation of the 
neo-liberal mainstream and reactions to changing gender roles can take in 
European models of capitalism. Are the actors incorporating the potential for 
social inequality harboured within the ‘liberalisation process’ into the archi-
tectures of the various models or seeking to contain it? In what ways are they 
reforming those architectures in order to absorb and make use of the potential 
                                           
1  This aspect of our approach will undoubtedly be of particular interest to a journal 
dedicated to ‘action research’. 
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for developing the individual and societal labour capacity released by the 
changes in gender roles? 
These questions are discussed here in two stages. We begin by showing, 
with the aid of examples, that trends towards adjustment to the ‘liberalisation 
process’ observed in past years have not led to convergence among the 
various models of capitalism or to harmonisation of their social contents. 
Drawing on three textbook examples of the European models of capitalism, 
namely Sweden and Germany as representatives of the ‘coordinated’ variant 
and the UK as the representative of the ‘liberal’ variant, the main features of 
the various national reactions to the challenges of neo-liberalism are outlined 
and the new tensions facing these models at the start of the current crisis are 
described. In the second stage, we examine the different ways in which these 
three models of capitalism are adjusting to the change in gender roles. In the 
concluding summary, it will be made clear that, in view of the social damage 
brought about in past decades, it is now necessary to redefine the functions of 
the state, the content of which will depend essentially on the strength of 
social pressure and the self-confidence of the actors. In essence, what is at 
issue here is not a new era of ‘unquestioning faith in the state’. However, the 
starting point for any redefinition of the functions of the state is rejection of 
the state’s unquestioning faith in the market.  
2. Varieties of capitalism – Room for political manoeuvre 
The current crisis has triggered changes in the functioning of contemporary 
capitalism whose effects will be felt in the long term. A synchronous world-
wide economic crisis, which is unusual enough, is directly linked to the 
bursting of the gigantic speculative bubble that had built up for 30 years over 
several economic cycles (Foster/Magdoff 2009). The reversal of the relation-
ship between the financial and ‘real’ economies that lies behind it was sum-
marised, with reference to the US, by Reich (2008: 98) in the following 
catchy phrase: ‘Before 1980 Wall Street was the lackey of manufacturing 
industry (...). After 1980 manufacturing industry became the lackey of Wall 
Street’. Profit rates which could be ‘produced’ in the financial industry were 
increasingly regarded, and imposed, as benchmarks for the profitability of 
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companies in other sectors such as manufacturing and non-financial services. 
This implementation of the shareholder value principle is closely linked with 
such fundamental tendencies in contemporary capitalism as globalisation 
(intensification of inter-firm competition in the global market, radical 
changes in the international division of labour, technological revolutions in 
communications and transport), the deregulation of product, financial and 
labour markets at nation state and supranational level and, not least, the 
advent of services as the most labour-intensive sector of the advanced capital-
ist economies – with far-reaching consequences for the reshuffling of the 
cards in ‘industrial’ relations. At the heart of this ‘capital market-driven 
capitalism’ (Huffschmid 2002) lies the weakening of the state’s socially 
compensatory function.2 
In Europe, globalisation has gone hand in hand with ‘Europeanisation’: 
the creation of the EU internal market in conjunction with the introduction of 
the free movement of capital, goods, services and labour, the Eurozone 
stabilisation rules and the privatisation of state-owned companies and in-
creasing sections of public services, as well as the ensuing spread of market-
based forms of governance across the public sector. Europeanisation was and 
continues to be implemented by governments that then proceed to invoke the 
‘constraints’ of the globalised economy and the rules laid down by interna-
tional institutions such as the EU. Once set in motion, these rules and proc-
esses exert massive economic and political influence on nation states and 
their particular models of capitalism, developed over the previous decades. 
Globalisation and deregulation have left deep marks on economic and social 
regimes (Stiglitz 2002).  
                                           
2  For the US labour market specialist and former labour minister Robert Reich (2008), 
the decline in the state’s socially compensatory role, which he describes with reference 
to the USA, also constitutes a democratic deficit. I also consider this assessment to be 
important, because advocates of the ‘liberal’ form of capitalism that has been plunged 
into crisis never tire of identifying ‘more state’ with ‘more bureaucracy’. The decisive 
point here is not that the criticism of bureaucracy is unjustified. On the contrary: a 
considerable part of the mass basis of neo-liberalism can probably be attributed to 
alienating experiences with state bureaucracy. There are indeed considerable short-
comings in state action, but the institutional rebuilding that has gone on in past dec-
ades, involving the systematic elimination of obstacles to the dominance of the finan-
cial markets, has probably given rise to the most dangerous shortcomings.  
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Given the power with which this neo-liberal mainstream was launched in 
previous decades, it can reasonably be assumed that it must lead ultimately to 
convergence among the various models of capitalism that have evolved 
historically. Thus Coates (2000: 250) advances the argument that institutions 
in the various national models may continue to differ in form, but that the 
effects of these differences on the living conditions of dependent employees 
will become increasingly less significant. He concludes that ‘The models 
have stopped working.’ 
This argument certainly has a kernel of truth, but I regard it as questionable 
nevertheless. This is evident from scrutiny of a few indicators of inequality that 
can be expected to have undergone particularly far-reaching changes in the 
wake of the liberalisation process. 
2.1 Are the models still working? 
In most Western countries, the increase in social inequality lies at the heart of 
the changes that have taken place since the end of the strategic class com-
promise that remained in place for three decades after the end of the Second 
World War. It is an essential part of the causal relationship on which the rise 
of the financial markets and the implementation of the shareholder value 
principle are based (Huffschmid 2002). One manifestation of this change is 
the reversal, 30 years ago, of the trend in the wage-profit ratio within the EU 
(table 1).  
Table 1:  Adjusted wage share in EU-15* 
1960-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2007 
71.3 72.7 70.1 67.6 64.9 
* Employee compensation per employee as % of GDP adjusted for factor costs per employee 
 Source: ECFIN (2008: 97) 
 
A further aspect of social inequality is the distribution of gross income from 
dependent employment. This indicator is also particularly meaningful because 
most top earners not only have income from capital but are also dependent 
employees. Here too, the dominant trend at least since the mid-1990s is abso-
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lutely clear: in virtually all EU member states, the income gap has widened 
further. However, closer examination of the distribution structure reveals that 
not only do the levels of unequal distribution continue to differ considerably 
from each other but that the rate and structure of the widening of the income gap 
also vary greatly (table 2).  
Table 2:  Changes in income distribution in selected OECD countries* 
 Relationships between income deciles 
 9:1 9:5 5:1 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
Sweden 2.20 2.33 1.59 1.68 1.39 1.39 
Finland 2.34 2.42 1.66 1.70 1.41 1.43 
Denmark 2.47 2.64 1.69 1.73 1.46 1.53 
Netherlands 2.77 2.91 1.71 1.76 1.62 1.65 
France 3.08 3.10 1.93 2.01 1.59 1.54 
Germany 2.79 3.13 1.79 1.84 1.56 1.70 
UK 3.48 3.51 1.88 1.96 1.85 1.79 
Spain 4.22 3.53 2.10 2.14 2.01 1.65 
Ireland 4.01 3.57 1.98 2.07 2.02 1.72 
Poland 3.40 4.31 1.97 2.18 1.72 1.98 
USA 4.59 4.86 2.17 2.31 2.11 2.10 
Hungary 3.96 5.63 2.09 2.46 1.89 2.33 
OECD** 3.12 3.39 1.81 1.93 1.70 1.73 
* Gross income of full-time dependent employees; the higher the value, the greater the earnings dispersion. 
The first column shows the change in the income spread between the richest and poorest decile of wage and 
salary earners, the second that between the richest decile and the average income and the third that between 
the middle and lowest decile (measured at the upper limits of each decile). The data are comparable over time 
but not fully between countries. Countries ranked by ratio of 9th to 1st deciles in 2005. 
** unweighted average 
  Source: OECD (2007a: 268)  
 
With regard to levels, there are no surprises: Northern Europe has the small-
est earnings dispersion, while two of the new EU member states included in 
the OECD statistics, together with Ireland, Spain and the UK, have the widest 
income gaps in Europe. Perhaps the only surprising thing to note is the gap 
between the UK and the USA, which are usually included in the same ‘lib-
eral’ variety of capitalism. However, the rate and structure of the changes do 
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not match all the usual expectations. It is true that inequality in Northern 
Europe has increased only slightly, but the same applies to the UK. The 
reason is to be found in the data on the upper and lower parts of the income 
pyramid. Everywhere, even in Northern Europe, inequality in the upper half 
of the income range has increased. From Sweden to Spain, the incomes of the 
top ten per cent are moving away from those in the middle of the range. In 
contrast, middle incomes are evolving in the opposite direction relative to 
those in the lowest part of the range. In many countries, including Germany, 
the gap is widening here too, but in Sweden it has remained constant, at a low 
level, while in France, Ireland, Spain and the UK (!) it has actually narrowed.  
The widening income gap has many causes, which cannot be investigated 
in detail here.3 What matters for our present purpose is the role of power, 
policy and political power relations as they interact with the architectures of 
national employment models. This is made clear by examination of the 
different trends in income inequality in Sweden, the UK and Germany. In all 
three countries, it is true, the earnings dispersion in the upper half of the 
pyramid has increased; however, the trends in the lower half have been in the 
opposite direction: stability in Sweden, increased inequality in Germany and 
a decline in inequality in the UK. The most important reason for the surpris-
ing development in the UK is probably to be found in the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage and its stepwise increase since 1998 (Bosch/Wein-
kopf 2006). As a result of this policy initiative, the increased inequality in the 
                                           
3  Particular emphasis is placed in the literature on changes in skill structures and labour 
market shortages, the rise of the service economy, and in particular of labour-intensive 
activities, the increase in precarious employment, locational competition in the global 
economy and, not least, unemployment (cf. the literature survey in Saniter 2007). In 
more recent publications on the long-term evolution of the income distribution in the 
USA, however, there have been increased references to the importance of the power 
aspect, which in the earlier economic literature was a self-evident element of the anal-
ysis: ‘The strengthening of income equality for a whole generation after the Second 
World War, when wages kept pace with productivity at national level, was the result 
of a policy that began in the Great Depression with the New Deal and was streng-
thened after the war by political action, both by the state and in private industry. In-
come stability was the not the result of the ‘natural’ working of economic processes; 
rather it was the result of policy intended to encourage it’ (Levy/Temin 2007: 39).  
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upper half of the income distribution has been almost completely offset by 
the decline in inequality in the lower half. 
Germany, on the other hand, has experienced the greatest increase in ine-
quality (taking both halves of the income distribution together) of all the EU-
15 countries included in the OECD statistics. The decline in coverage by 
collective agreement, on the one hand, and the absence of a statutory mini-
mum wage, on the other, have left a clear imprint on the income distribution 
in Germany within a short space of time. It should also be noted that the 
OECD statistics include only full-time employees. Since the employment 
structure in Germany shifted during the period in question strongly in favour 
of part-time working and particularly so-called ‘mini-jobs’ and there is a 
disproportionate share of low earnings in these areas (Lehndorff et al. 2009), 
the result would be even more unfavourable for Germany relative to other 
European countries if part-timers were included in the analysis. 
The admittedly very crude indicators presented above embolden us to ad-
vance the initial argument that the effects of the great ‘liberalisation process’ 
differ depending on the institutional environment, political power relations 
and what policy objectives set by the leading actors it encounters in individ-
ual countries. It is the interaction of these factors that determines how na-
tional models adapt to the neo-liberal pressure for change. This argument will 
now be examined in greater detail, taking as the basis for discussion the 
contrasting examples of Sweden, Germany and the UK.  
2.2 Sweden, the UK and Germany: policy matters 
Sweden, Germany and the UK are, respectively, the flagships of the ‘coordi-
nated’ and ‘liberal’ varieties of capitalism in Europe. Sweden and the UK 
stand out particularly by virtue of some surprising similarities. Although, as 
might be expected, certain indicators of social inequality reveal considerable 
difference between the two countries (see table 2 above), until the current 
crisis they had by far (besides Denmark) the highest employment rates in 
Europe. At the same time, governments in both countries (in the 1990s in 
Sweden and since the end of the 1990s in the UK) succeeded in revitalising 
their national employment models, at least temporarily. 
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For some years, the Swedish model has been regarded in EU and even 
OECD documents as an example of successful economic, employment and 
social policies, despite having been pronounced dead by many in the 1990s. 
In fact, it has been through several profound crises in the past three decades, 
starting with the economic collapse triggered by the early opening-up to the 
global financial markets (Ryner 2002; Dølvik 2009). Sweden was also one of 
the pioneers of product market deregulation and of so-called active labour 
market policies, which it introduced before it joined the EU and such strate-
gies became part of EU policy dogma. Such adjustments to the ‘liberalisation 
process’, which were seen by Swedish Social Democrats as their variant of 
the ‘Third Way’, are balanced socially by the universal welfare state and the 
system of industry-level collective agreements (I return to this subject below; 
cf. on this and what follows Anxo/Niklasson 2009). Against this background, 
the above-averagely positive assessments by employees of their working and 
employment conditions (Seifert/Tangian 2009) is understandable. 
A key element in the institutional change in Sweden following the most 
recent, particularly deep crisis of the first half of the 1990s was industrial 
relations. The centralised collective bargaining system was broken up at the 
beginning of the 1990s. This considerably reduced the country’s capacity for 
economic management; at the same time, the welfare state came under enor-
mous pressure as a result of the economic crisis and the need to restructure in 
response to globalisation and its impact on the small and open Swedish 
economy. With active support from the state, which made use of the whole 
gamut of its capabilities, from monetary policy via research policy to labour 
market policy, trade unions and employers’ associations agreed on a new 
combination of centralised and decentralised collective bargaining. The 
traditional system, based on a ‘solidaristic incomes policy’, was supple-
mented by the introduction of a considerable degree of flexibility at firm 
level. The pension reform introduced at the end of the 1990s (in a period of 
economic growth!) can be seen as a similar coordinated and measured ad-
justment to the liberalisation process. On the one hand, it strengthened the 
equivalence principle, but at the same time introduced private elements to 
supplement the state pension scheme (Palme et al. 2009). The economic basis 
for these reforms was an increase in international competitiveness resulting 
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from considerable state and private expenditure on research and development 
(with priority being given to the IT industry) and on the education and train-
ing system; the model is ‘financially sustainable in conjunction with a highly 
productive market sector’ (Becker 2008: 246). According to calculations 
carried out by Sauer et al. (2007), the high level of education, together with a 
relatively egalitarian income distribution, made a particularly important 
contribution to the rapid growth that occurred in Sweden and other Northern 
European countries from the end of the 1990s onwards. 
Against this background, Anxo/Niklasson (2009) speak of a ‘renaissance’ 
of the original Swedish model. At the same time, however, they note that this 
revitalisation has not in any way led the Swedish employment system into 
calm waters, as indicated by the Social Democrats’ loss of power at the 2006 
parliamentary elections. The current government’s reform of the unemploy-
ment insurance system is intended not least – and not without success – to 
weaken the trade unions’ institutional power.4 Persistently high levels of 
unemployment by Swedish standards and a high level of early retirement are 
putting a strain on the welfare state’s financial base. The temptation to pro-
mote the employment of low-skill workers by expanding the private service 
sector with the aid of a low-wage segment is gathering considerable political 
momentum. However, this would further increase the need for income redis-
tribution through the welfare state. At 48.3%, Sweden has the second highest 
tax and social security contributions rate in the OECD (after Denmark, at 
48.7%; 2007 figures).This compares with 36.3% in Germany, 36.1% in the 
UK and an EU-15 average of 39.8% (OECD 2009: 75). The amount of redis-
tribution contained within this figure is always a potential source of conflict; 
the benefits it provides must be persuasive and it requires a broad base within 
the population and strong support from politicians and the public. Continuity 
through change is obviously not a closed chapter in the development of the 
Swedish model of the welfare state. 
                                           
4  The trade unions traditionally managed the unemployment insurance system, which 
assured them high membership rates; this institutional connection (the so-called ‘Gent’ 
system) is currently being dismantled and at the same time trade union membership is 
being made more expensive (Dølvik 2009). 
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Something similar can already be said with some certainty about the em-
ployment model in the UK. As Rubery et al. (2009) note, up until the out-
break of the present crisis, British capitalism had developed considerably 
more successfully than she, and many other sceptical commentators besides, 
had assumed in the mid-1990s. After the decline of traditional manufacturing 
industries, hastened by the Thatcher government, the dynamic centre of the 
British economy shifted increasingly to the growth of financial services, the 
export of services (assisted by the English language) and to a relatively 
restricted range of industries (such as oil and pharmaceuticals) tailored to the 
US market in particular. Between 1983 and 2008, the gross value added 
produced by British manufacturing rose by around 35%, while the figure for 
the service sector was 150% (Thibault 2008). At the same time, the rapidly 
expanding service sector proved itself able to absorb the graduates of the fast-
growing higher education system (in a context of low levels of specialisation 
and high external mobility in the labour market). This in turn was consistent 
with other factors, such as the relative youth of these graduates, which meant 
they tended to settle down and start families at a fairly young age, thereby 
contributing to the UK’s relatively high birth rate. All these factors helped to 
make the British model one of the successes of globalisation. However, the 
increased social polarisation associated with it, and in particular the spread of 
unemployment, precarity and poverty among low-skill workers, became 
increasingly to be seen as a liability, so that the Conservatives were eventu-
ally voted out of office. The ‘Third Way’ policy adopted by New Labour in 
the late 1990s set important new priorities within the architecture of the 
liberal welfare state, with an emphasis on fighting poverty (particularly 
among single-parent households). One of the cornerstones of this new ap-
proach was the linking of in-work benefits with a newly introduced statutory 
minimum wage. Given the low level of labour market regulation, this linkage 
was unavoidable if an explosion of state-funded wage subsidies was to be 
avoided. At the same time, it had the effect, already alluded to above, of 
making the UK one of the few countries in which the earnings dispersion has 
hardly increased in the past ten years, although the initial level was of course 
already high. 
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Another new feature was increased public expenditure on health and so-
cial services. The expansive public expenditure policy which, since the UK is 
not bound by the Maastricht criteria, followed self-defined guidelines linked 
to the economic cycle, made a decisive contribution in the first five years of 
the new century to the growth of the economy and of employment. This 
represented another necessary shift of emphasis within the British growth 
model. The 2001 recession saw a significant decline in the employment 
dynamic in the private sector. It is true that a collapse of the private sector 
was avoided because of private consumption funded by mortgage loans and 
based ultimately on rising house prices, so that the economy, wages and 
employment grew in the first decade of the new century at considerably faster 
rates than in Germany, for example. However, the decisive impetus for 
employment growth was now coming from the state. Between 1998 and 
2005, the number of public-sector employees rose by more than 600,000. 
(figure 1) with the main focus on health, education and social services. At the 
same time, the associated awarding of contracts to private service providers 
created new employment effects in the private service sector (i.e. outside 
financial services as well). Between 2000 and 2003, around 550,000 private-
sector jobs were created directly by increased public expenditure, so that the 
entire net increase in employment in the UK since 2000 was attributable to 
higher public expenditure (Edmonds/Glynn 2005).  
All this changed nothing fundamental in the architecture of the British 
model, with its combination of a low level of labour market regulation and a 
‘residual’ welfare state focused on combating poverty. However, important 
new elements were added to the model, strengthening its social dimension. 
‘The differences from the US model and the similarities with Europe are even 
greater now than they were in the mid-1990s’, wrote Rubery et al. (2009), 
explicitly rejecting the frequently used term ‘Anglo-Saxon model’. At the 
same time, the UK’s current economic problems reveal just how fragile the 
economic foundations of this ‘Third Way’ were. The excessive importance of 
the City as a global financial centre, promotion of which continued seam-
lessly under New Labour, together with the credit and house price bubble that 
was such an important driver of household consumption, have proved to be 
the Achilles’ heel of the liberal model’s success. 
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Figure 1:  Annual employment growth in the public and private sector in 
the UK, 1993-2005 (in %) 
 
Source: Hicks (2005) 
 
Compared with the changes that have taken place in the British and Swedish 
models of capitalism, the German model of capitalism has been through a 
period of radical change (on what follows, cf. Lehndorff et al. 2009). Two 
decades ago, towards the end of its heyday, the core of the German model 
could be characterised as a combination of economic dynamism and low 
social inequality. With the aid of generalising institutions, such as the indus-
trial relations system, labour law and the welfare state, the strategy of high 
value added and high-quality production in a manufacturing sector geared to 
producing for the global market, which was fostered by long-term relations 
within capital and between capital and labour, worked to the advantage of the 
economy as a whole and of broad sections of German society. From the 
1980s, however, it became increasingly clear that ‘capitalism had become 
determined to break out of the social-democratic stable in which it had been 
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pressed after the war’ (Streeck 2009: 235). In the 1990s, after the major 
economic and political turning point of German reunification, this determina-
tion began increasingly to influence public debates and political decisions, 
until it became the dominant paradigm during the period of the SPD-Green 
coalition government. The image of Germany as the ‘sick man of Europe’ 
(Sinn 2003), whose economy was becoming the great loser of globalisation 
because of high wages and rigid labour market regulations and whose welfare 
state was becoming ‘unaffordable’ and threatened to stifle the entire eco-
nomic dynamic, encapsulates the dominant perception of the country pur-
veyed by its economic and political elites and the media until the middle of 
the decade that has just finished.5 
As a result of these changes, the parties to collective bargaining have been 
weakened and the scope of their agreements has shrunk considerably. The 
labour market ‘reforms’ have encouraged the growth of social inequality and 
the widespread perception of increased job insecurity, even in the economic 
upturn of the two years prior to the current crisis. Tax reforms have reduced 
the state’s ability to counteract the declining job creation potential of Ger-
many’s export industries. It is true that these industries have been able to 
reclaim their position as world leaders that they had temporarily lost, but in 
doing so they took advantage of the new environment of increasingly social 
and institutional disintegration and fragmentation, which has made a signifi-
cant contribution to their ability to compete on price. The rapid expansion of 
the low-wage sector has become a symbol of the social fragmentation and 
disintegration that characterise the new German model.  
The fragmentation of industrial relations and the deterioration of working 
and employment conditions contentiously have become important elements 
                                           
5  Even Streeck (2009: 252) partially appropriates this self-perception when he writes 
that the ‘postwar state of organized capitalism (found) at some point its resources for 
social protection exhausted’, and that the German state’s espousal of ‘policies of libe-
ralization’ was intended ‘to relieve it of responsibilities it no longer has the capacities 
to carry’. His argument, which is actually intended to be a plea for a revival of analys-
es of capitalism, becomes at this point an implicit justification of the policy of ‘state 
withdrawal’ implemented over the previous decade (Bofinger 2008). As a result, ‘ca-
pitalism’ emerges as a subjectless dynamic that the institutions of German capitalism 
that have existed hitherto have been unable to withstand.  
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of the export production model that was so celebrated until the autumn of 
2008. At the same time, however, they have also become the Achilles’ heel 
of the employment model as a whole.6 In contrast to the heyday of the old 
employment model, the generalising institutions are now considerably less 
robust, with important elements having been damaged or even partially 
eliminated. The model’s ‘architecture’ has been fundamentally destabilised. 
The result is a vicious circle: wage increases can be achieved quite readily in 
the export-oriented manufacturing sectors but not in those sectors oriented to 
the stagnating domestic market, which is where large swaths of the private 
and public services are located. Although this has reduced costs in the eco-
nomic environment in which the export machine operates, stagnating wages 
and expanding areas of precarious and/or low-wage employment do not 
provide an adequate basis for increasing domestic demand.  
Thus the German employment system has developed in a direction in 
which economic success depends increasingly on competition based on 
labour costs and less on the broadly-based deployment and development of 
the innovative potential of skilled workers. The focus of attention is increas-
ingly on reducing labour costs rather than the development of labour capacity 
(Arbeitsvermögen) that could be an asset for society as a whole. The welfare 
state’s redistributive function has also been seriously weakened by a series of 
tax and social reforms. Thus the world export champion was brought down to 
earth in the autumn of 2008 by circular relationships within the economy. 
Economic success that is increasingly based on disintegration and fragmenta-
tion must be fragile. If we are to assess Germany’s strength as it went into the 
current crisis, then it has to be said that the crisis was not simply the result of 
external shocks but was also internally generated. The country’s ‘reformed’ 
model was ripe for crisis. 
                                           
6  Moreover, they have equally become an Achilles’ heel of the balances within the 
world economy in general, and the Euro zone in particular. In the spring of 2010, the 
French government sparked a public debate about the sustainability of the German 
export model based increasingly on labour cost competitiveness, at the expense of the 
development of the internal market in Germany. In fact, it was exactly at the strategic 
turn of German labour market policy in 2003 with its impacts on the wider field of 
labour relations and income distribution when domestic demand per capita in Germa-
ny began to be left behind by domestic demand per capita in France (Duval 2010). 
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Interestingly, however, it is those institutions of the traditional German 
model that survived the earlier period of ‘labour market reforms’ that have 
proved, in the crisis, to be stabilising factors in the labour market. They 
include the powerful instrument of short-time working, collective agreements 
that safeguard jobs and the rights of works councils to codetermination. 
Germany’s economic downturn in 2009 was particularly severe by EU stan-
dards, while the feared collapse of the labour market has not happened, at 
least for the time being. This could give renewed sustenance to the disputes 
about the future of the ‘German model’ in the years to come. 
2.3 Parallels and contrasts 
In contrast to Germany, the adjustments of the UK and Swedish employment 
models were based on above-average levels of economic growth, which was 
actively promoted by the state and the central banks. Both the Maastricht 
criteria and the current version of the ECB rules would have been obstacles to 
renewal in both variants. However, the economic contrast between these two 
variants of the ‘Third Way’ is strikingly underscored by the most recent 
developments. In economic and social terms, the Swedish way is considera-
bly more sustainable than the British way, which is largely built on the 
quicksand of the financial markets. At the same time as maintaining a high 
level of employment in the public sector, the Swedish model seeks to rein-
force the advantages of specialisation in world markets by focusing on highly 
productive manufacturing industries in order to provide the basis for creating 
value added. However, the comprehensive welfare state, which under these 
economic circumstances – and the associated high level of employment – is 
affordable, requires a strong political consensus within Swedish society.  
The revitalisation of both models over the past ten to 15 years also brings 
home the importance of the interactions between architectures and actors in 
the various employment models. In line with the liberal nature of the British 
model, the strengthening of its social elements was largely the result of 
government action, trade union influence being too weak to counter the 
negative effects of liberalism on employment and working conditions (see 
below). The Swedish trade unions, on the other hand, have once again proved to 
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be the cornerstone of the employment model. It is not without reason that the 
current government is sawing away at the institutional roots of trade union 
influence. However, the scale of state action certainly stands out as a major 
similarity in the evolution of the Swedish and British models. For all the lip 
service both countries’ social-democratic governments, each beholden to their 
respective versions of the ‘Third Way’, have paid to the importance of the ‘free 
market’, they showed themselves as less fervent believers in the market than the 
SDP-Green coalition government, which came into office claiming they were 
going to emulate New Labour. Sweden has never called its strong state into 
question, while the strengthening of the state was the implicit agenda of a British 
government that preached neo-liberalism to its unsuspecting German friends. 
In contrast to these two examples of continuity through change, the Ger-
man model, one of the flagships of the ‘coordinated market economy’ in 
Europe, has undergone a fundamental change of character under permanent 
bombardment from debates and ‘reforms’ inspired by neo-liberalism. To a 
considerable degree, it has lost its long-established ability to translate eco-
nomic success into social success. Combined with the conservatism of the 
German welfare state, model of the family and education system, which to 
date has been overcome only in certain respects, this has produced a ‘toxic 
mix’, which is proving to be a considerable obstacle to the production of the 
human resources required for the future development of German society and 
its economy.  
The key role that state action can play in reining in the potential for inequal-
ity inherent in the neo-liberal mainstream becomes particularly clear when – as 
in the next section – the different strategies that can be adopted in order to adapt 
national models of capitalism to changing gender roles are considered. As can 
be demonstrated by a look at the contrasting features of public support for 
female labour market participation in general and at different approaches to cope 
with the need of an expansion of professional elder care services in particular, 
the challenge for modern capitalist economies goes far beyond a mere return of 
the state. The impacts of neo-liberalism on existing models of capitalism are 
intertwined with upcoming issues such as demographic changes. Hence the 
challenge to develop concepts of state responsibilities and action which at the 
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same time draw conclusions from the crisis of neo-liberalism and address more 
fundamental changes in European societies. 
3. Institutional support for gender equality 
As noted in the introduction, one major shortcoming of the social science 
debate on the various forms of (welfare) capitalism lies in the fact that the 
strands of literature on varieties of capitalism and on welfare regimes coexist 
rather than interact with each other. This is to be regretted particularly be-
cause the challenges to the current employment models arise not only out of 
the revolution in the functioning of international capitalism, that is the major 
trend towards liberalism, but also out of changes in social structures and 
norms, as reflected particularly in the changes in gender roles.  
To date, however, the social pressure generated by the major trend to-
wards increasing female participation rates has not been brought to bear in all 
countries with sufficient power to counteract state action. The conservative 
family models and welfare regimes of Southern Europe and some other EU 
countries, such as Austria and Germany (Dingeldey 2002), bear witness to 
this fact. This (literally counterproductive) contradiction is reflected in the 
evolution of women’s labour market participation, which has increased 
further in all European countries, even in those that lag furthest behind in this 
respect (table 3). However, the picture becomes more differentiated as soon 
as part-time working is taken into account and the changes in full-time 
equivalents are considered. The most striking finding is that the employment 
rate in Austria has actually declined when expressed in terms of full-time 
equivalents and has increased only slightly in Germany, where the employ-
ment rate is now below the EU average. The same applies to the difference 
between the employment rates in full-time equivalents for women and those 
for men, which is described in the table as the employment gap between men 
and women. Here too, as with the gender pay gap, the discrepancy between 
men’s and women’s labour market situations is greater in Germany than on 
average within the EU. 
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Table 3:  Women’s employment rates (as % of female population aged 
between 15 and 64 and in full-time equivalents), 2006  
 
Employment 
rate* 
Employment 
rate in full-
time equiva-
lents 
Change 
compared 
with 1995** 
Employment 
gap between 
men and 
women 
2006*** 
Finland 67.3 62.9 +9.1 - 6.6 
Denmark 73.4 62.5 +5.2 - 13.6 
Sweden 70.7 61.0 +2.5 - 11.4 
Czech Republic 56.8 55.3 -0.4 - 18.2 
UK 65.8 51.7 +4.7 - 21.3 
France 57.7 50.7 +4.5 - 16.0 
Hungary 51.1 50.2 +5.7 - 7.0 
Austria 63.5 49.9 -3.5 - 22.7 
EU-27 57.1 48.8 k.A. - 20.6 
EU-15 58.4 48.2 +5.9 - 22.6 
Spain 53.2 46.8 +17.9 - 27.8 
Germany 61.5 46.5 +0.4 - 22.9 
Poland 48.2 46.0 k.A. - 14.0 
Netherlands 67.7 42.9 +9.1 - 29.4 
Italy 46.3 41.4 7.6 - 28.5 
* Women in employment relative to total number of women aged 15-64 
** Employment rate in full-time equivalents in 2006 compared with the employment rate in full-time equivalents in 
1995 in percentage points; comparison year for Hungary is 1996, for Czech Republic 1998 
** Difference between the employment rate in full-time equivalents for women and the employment rate in full-
time equivalents for men in percentage points. 
  Source: European Commission 2007; own calculations 
 
Of course the pace and structure of the increase in women’s labour market 
participation are not determined solely by the supply of labour, but are also 
influenced by the demand side of the labour market. In this regard, Esping-
Andersen (2002: 69) speaks of a ‘double job multiplier effect’. Women’s 
earnings increase household incomes, to which in Northern Europe they now 
contribute almost 50%. At the same time, the trend towards more egalitarian 
employment structures increases the demand for external services (roughly 
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calculated, 100 jobs held by women create a further 15 service jobs). Social 
and socially-oriented personal services are of particular importance in this 
regard. There is a strong correlation between the female participation rate in 
full-time equivalents and the numbers of hours’ work carried out in social 
and socially-oriented services per head of population (Lehndorff 2006).  
It is at this point that the welfare state comes into play, since a significant 
share of these services is provided by the public sector or at least is funded by 
the public purse. This is also reflected in public expenditure on social ser-
vices as a share of GDP. The lion’s share of public expenditure on social 
services is still accounted for by healthcare. However, figure 2 also shows 
‘other’ social services, which among other things include public expenditure 
on childcare and care of the elderly. In this regard, there is a dramatic gulf 
between countries and their different welfare states. As expected, and in line 
with typologies of welfare state regimes, the Northern and Southern Euro-
pean countries constitute a contrasting pair. What is striking, however, is the 
scale of the differences. In Sweden, the volume of hours worked per capita in 
social services is two to three times greater than in Italy and the share of state 
expenditure on social services (excluding health and education) in GDP is 
nine times that in Italy. On the other hand, the continental welfare state 
regimes offer a less homogeneous picture. Here it is France and Hungary that 
particularly catch the eye; their welfare states – albeit against a background of 
very different traditions – have for decades been used to support family 
policy with the aid of considerable investment in childcare facilities. Ger-
many’s backwardness in this regard is also striking, however. The share of 
public expenditure on ‘other’ social services in total GDP is almost a third 
lower in Germany than in France and no less than three quarters lower than in 
Sweden. 
Once again, it is the UK’s profile in these figures that is most surprising. 
It is not only the Sweden’s social-democratic regime but also the UK’s liberal 
regime that seem better able to accommodate the fundamental social trend 
towards increasing female labour market participation than the conservative 
welfare state regime.  
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Figure 2:  Public expenditure on social services as % of GDP in selected 
OECD countries, 2003 
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Source: OECD (2007b: 20) 
 
However, this similarity is achieved in very different ways. Besides the 
availability of care for young children, the most significant indicator of the 
modernity of European social models in terms of gender policy is probably 
the elder care regime put in place in response to the interlinked challenges of 
increasing female labour market participation and ageing societies. 
3.1 Care of the elderly 
The elder care regimes that are currently emerging in various European coun-
tries can be differentiated from each other by the extent to which and the ways 
in which a market for care services is being created and how that market is 
being structured (Simonazzi 2009). As summarised schematically in figure 3, 
such markets may be either formal or informal in character, that is they may be 
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based primarily on wage work or on unpaid family work. In between these two 
extremes there are hybrid forms, such as those that are being developed in 
Germany and Austria. In all three types, but most likely in the two last-named 
ones, the use of low-paid immigrant workers, whether they be illegal or operat-
ing in the informal economy, may play an important role.  
Figure 3:  Typology of elder care markets 
Elder care markets 
 
Welfare state  
regimes 
Primarily formal 
Primarily informal 
(family + informal 
labour market) 
Hybrid (family + 
primarily formal) 
Liberal 
UK: provision of 
services; >50% private 
providers 
  
Nordic 
SE: provision of 
services, mainly public 
providers 
  
Continental FR: earmarked cash benefits  
DE, AT: choice 
between payment of 
cash benefits, non-
earmarked cash 
benefits and cash 
benefits for market 
services 
Southern European  IT, EL: non-earmarked cash benefits 
ES: changeover to 
earmarked cash 
benefits 
Source: Simonazzi (2009); own representation 
 
As the summary shows, a formal care market is most easily established on 
the basis of entitlement to care services (in this respect, Sweden and the UK 
are similar in their basic approaches). The earmarked apportionment of funds, 
as happens in France, has a similar effect. As soon as the funds allocated are 
not earmarked for a particular purpose, as is the case in Italy or Greece, then 
the door is opened to the creation of an informal care ‘market’ based on low-
paid immigrant or family labour. The care regime in Spain, as well as the 
Germany system that has been established on the basis of long-term care 
insurance, are hybrid forms (cf. Kümmerling’s contribution to the present 
volume).  
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The elder care regimes reveal particularly clearly how European welfare 
state and employment models are reacting to the interlinked challenges of 
increasing female labour market participation and ageing societies (figure 4).  
Figure 4:  Change in gender roles: the labour market-welfare state regime 
nexus 
Types of state reactions to 
changes in gender roles 
Example 
countries Problems 
Containment of rise in female 
labour market participation 
through conservative incentive 
structure; precarisation through 
dual labour market structures  
IT, EL Informal sector, social division, erosion of tax base 
Modernisation through strength-
ening of social services by 
‘market state’ and active labour 
market policy 
UK 
Social inequality among women as 
a result of pressure on employment 
conditions offered by private 
providers, but minimal anti-poverty 
measures 
Modernisation through strategy 
of social investment SE High tax rate as political price 
Slowing of rise in female labour 
market participation and diver-
sion into dead-ends as a result of 
competing incentive structures 
DE 
Distorted modernisation, social 
inequality among women, fiscal 
burdens 
 
Once again, it is the non-identical twins, Sweden and the UK, that first catch 
the eye. They are similar in their strategy of creating a formal services and 
labour market for elder care. However, they differ radically from each other 
in the prioritising of public or private provision of care services. However 
open Swedish policy has shown itself to be in respect of the privatisation of 
various services, elder care services (together with childcare and education) 
have to date remained largely in the public sector, and primarily in the hands 
of local authorities (Heintze 2009; Veggeland 2007).  
The British way, on the other hand, combines a relatively high level of 
expenditure on social services with extensive outsourcing and privatisation. 
In the British ‘market state approach’ (Rubery et al. 2009), the state does 
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indeed invest considerably more in social services than the conservative 
German welfare state; increasingly, however, it is giving the money to a 
weakly regulated private sector. Even if the tender guidelines are intended to 
obtain not simply the lowest price but rather the ‘best value’, this cannot by 
itself compensate for the weakness of the collective bargaining arrangements 
in these areas. As a result, the ‘market state’ helps to create a situation in 
which the expansion of social services goes hand in hand with low labour 
standards and social inequality, principally among women. 
So long as pronounced social inequality in incomes and labour standards is 
socially accepted or at least tolerated, the risks of this strategy lie primarily in 
the increasing potential for poverty, and particularly in the future threat of 
poverty in old age, which has already become an important social policy theme 
in the UK, principally because of the importance of private and company 
pension schemes and widespread reliance on property as a means of funding 
retirement. The social costs of the conservative welfare state regime, however, 
are already becoming clear today (and in Germany at least they are even begin-
ning to dawn on important social actors). Since women’s economic activity is 
increasing even without support from social services, much skilled labour 
capacity is being left idle through part-time working and so-called mini-jobs 
(Germany) or being redirected into areas of precarious and informal employ-
ment (Italy). Both variants reinforce the gender hierarchy in incomes and have 
negative effects on the tax base and in the longer term on pension entitlements, 
which in turn impacts negatively on social care budgets.  
3.2 Parallels and contrasts 
This necessarily abbreviated investigation of the link between welfare state 
and labour market regulation based on the example of care of the elderly 
draws attention to an important aspect of the interaction between architec-
tures and actors within national employment models. A ‘strong’ state can in 
future only be strong if it can build on strong self-organisation capabilities 
within society. Consideration of the national patterns of state action in re-
sponse to the change in gender roles makes this abundantly clear. The devel-
opment and utilisation of the immense possibilities of state action depend to a 
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large extent on the exertion of social pressure on the state actors. Where such 
pressure is weak, policy will tend to maintain an incentive structure that runs 
counter to the change in gender roles. As a result, various resources available 
to society will lie fallow. On the one hand, labour capacities are taken out of 
service or devalued, or even channelled into the informal sector. At the same 
time, the welfare state’s tax base is reduced, so that the potential of the 
‘double job multiplier effect’ of social investment cannot be fully exploited. 
And moreover, the birth rate declines, with the well-known long-term conse-
quences for the distributive conflicts around the financing of social security 
systems. If the social pressure is too weak to force the political actors away 
from this conservation policy, this also reduces the possibilities for action to 
counter the potential for disintegration that is inherent in the liberalisation 
process, since that process encourages the development of labour markets 
with rapidly expanding precarious or even informal segments. It also be-
comes more difficult to stabilise or revitalise labour market regulation based 
on collective agreements. 
On the other hand, both the liberal British and the social-democratic 
Swedish welfare state regimes are geared to supporting the change in gender 
roles, albeit in very different ways and with contrasting social effects.  
In the UK, the change in patterns of social behaviour and expectations has 
increasingly had an impact on state action. However, with the adoption of the 
‘market state’ strategy, a course was set that is consistent with and further 
develops the fundamental liberal orientation of the British model. As the 
provision of social services has expanded, bad working and employment 
conditions have been largely tolerated (‘job quantity’ has taken priority over 
‘job quality’); the market state has indeed invested considerable amounts of 
money, but at the same time many of the new activities have been subjected 
to private-sector competitive conditions. As a result, social polarisation had 
been increasing, particularly among women, and the employment effect in 
full-time equivalents is considerably lower than in Sweden (and only slightly 
higher than in France, where great importance has traditionally been attached 
to public investment in services). Since the trade unions and collective bar-
gaining arrangements are weak in the private sector, there is little to stand in 
the way of these developments.  
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In Sweden, on the other hand, any slipping of employment standards is 
opposed not only by the structure of welfare state investment (with priority 
being given to the public sector in core activities) but also by the strength of 
the trade unions and collective bargaining arrangements in both the public 
and private sectors. However, a different price – a political one – has to be 
paid, since the relative equality is associated with high levels of taxation and 
social security contributions. This takes away a considerable share of national 
income from capital’s accumulation process, leaving open the question of 
what economic and political consequences this has (Desai 2002: 255). So 
long as this restriction of the opportunities for capital valorisation can rely on 
a broad base of political support within society and the remaining opportuni-
ties for capital valorisation within the national framework are profitable, then 
this obviously does not create any problems for the country’s economic 
development. However, this model is diametrically opposed to powerful 
economic interests, as well as to the dominant economic doctrines. This is 
why there will be repeated attempts – and this is confirmed by the Swedish 
government’s policy since the last general election – to restrict the political 
base of support for this arrangement in society.  
4. Conclusion: beyond blind trust in the market 
If, in our analysis of the effects of economic liberalisation, the main focus of 
attention was on the political possibilities for developing measures to counter 
the potential for social inequality, the centre of attention in our examination 
of reactions to changing gender roles was the political possibilities for 
strengthening the labour capacity available to society and thereby develop a 
further counterweight to social polarisation. Against this background, the 
influence that can be exerted by a strong public sector, particularly in the area 
of social services, is underlined by the example of Sweden.  
In a number of European countries, but particularly in Germany, the ad-
justments to the process of economic liberalisation have been considerably 
more far-reaching than those to the change in gender roles. This significantly 
exacerbated the tensions in most European employment models in the years 
prior to the current crisis. Neglecting the new potential for the development 
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of societal resources released by the change in gender roles has further exac-
erbated the disintegration problems caused by economic liberalisation. Com-
parison with other European countries shows that Germany is one of those in 
which this toxic mix is at its most potent (and it can be no comfort to Ger-
mans that it is considerably more potent in Italy and Greece, where it has 
triggered real negative spirals, leading to fragmentation and demoralisation in 
the labour market).  
Thus warnings from the neo-liberal side against the resurgence of ‘un-
questioning faith in the state’ are simply evading the real issue, for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was policies based on blind faith in the market that were 
largely responsible for creating the current crisis. Secondly, it is structural 
conservatism cultivated by the state that is failing to make space for the 
newly released potential for social development and renewal. Thus, if the 
currently much debated ‘return of the state’ is to be anything more than a 
correction of ‘excesses in the financial markets’, the democratic state will be 
called upon to act in several capacities: as a regulating and redistributing 
institution, and also as an investor and service provider acting in the interests 
of society as a whole. 
A ‘return’ of this kind would in fact be something completely new for 
most European countries. In Germany, for example, but not only in Germany, 
it would mean embracing a fundamentally different growth model, in which, 
with the aid of state intervention, economic growth was organised in such a 
way as to take greater account of environmental and social considerations. 
New product market regulations could help to make growth ‘greener’, while 
new labour market regulations could make society more equal and hence 
boost domestic demand. Not least, however, the structure of social value 
creation could be shaped by the effective exertion of state influence on the 
extent and quality of social services. In education, health, childcare and care 
of the elderly, there is a need for both investment and expenditure on current 
operations, both in noticeably different orders of magnitude than has been the 
case to date.  
Whether there will ever be a ‘return’ of the state in this sense has up to 
now been a completely open question. It is to be feared that any such change 
of direction will be blocked by the all-stifling debate on public indebtedness, 
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which is likely to increase as a consequence of the measures taken to combat 
the crisis. It will be very difficult, in the face of the bleak predictions of a 
state doomed to inaction because of excessive indebtedness, to gain accep-
tance for the alternative scenario of a new, state-promoted growth model. 
However, the example of the Northern European countries shows that this 
alternative strategy can even help to reduce state indebtedness. However, this 
is a path that cannot be taken unless there is a political will to resume the 
distributive conflict. This battle would revolve around the increase in the 
share of taxation and social security contributions in GDP that would result 
from a return to a significantly higher top rate of taxation. Disputes about the 
quality of life in society will be ignited by the share of GDP taken by the 
state. This does not in any way imply a lack of regard for the democratic self-
organisation of social actors. On the contrary, in fact: it is precisely here that 
most of those mourning the political failures of the recent past are to be 
found. And the weaker the pressure exerted by organised interest groups in 
society, particularly the trade unions, is, the more half-hearted the ‘return’ of 
the state will be and the more limited its effects. What is at stake here is not 
blind faith in the state but rather lasting renunciation of the state that has 
blind faith in the market.  
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